A Pathway for Congress to Act?

After decades of procrastination on what is now looming as a financial catastrophe for millions of vulnerable Americans, Capitol Hill appears to be awakening to Social Security’s financial crisis and the critical need for near-term action. Media accounts are awash with articles lamenting the fact that this venerable senior support program is facing serious consequences in just six years, prompting a scramble for answers and, preferably, solutions.

Part of this mounting pressure to focus on Social Security comes from the dawning realization that kicking the can down the road for so long has led to another problem…this one related to timing. Reform measures designed to address the program’s long-term funding problems likely cannot prevent an abrupt change in the benefit stream. A short-term funding plan may now be required to avoid disrupting the lives of millions of vulnerable Americans.

The problem is complex, with implications affecting tens of millions of Americans. In a sense, seeing attention ramp up is reassuring, but it’s well known that the policy trade-offs and political consequences make Congress’s road ahead somewhat uncertain.  

What Just Happened?

Well, it didn’t “just happen,” since it’s been a publicly announced problem for decades. A cursory review of the Social Security Trustees Reports—the annual operational recap that assesses the program’s current and future financial state—will show that the alarm bells have been ringing since the late 1980s.

The 1989 Trustees Report, for example, suggested that development of a plan to deal with “deficits projected for future years should begin soon.” This flag was consistently raised in annual reports, leading to the most recent warning: “The OASI Trust Fund reserves are projected to become depleted in the fourth quarter of 2032, with 78 percent of benefits payable at that time.”

In this most recent annual accounting, the Trustees re-registered the call-to-action with this tepid advice: “The Trustees recommend that lawmakers address the projected trust fund shortfalls in a timely way in order to phase in necessary changes gradually and give workers and beneficiaries time to adjust.” The report also cited lawmakers’ “wide continuum of policy options” already on the table for consideration, ranging from those that increase program revenue to those that curtail benefits for newly eligible participants and/or existing beneficiaries.

In short, the menu of options for addressing the problem is extensive, and the implications are well known. But the time to act is short.

So, What’s the Next Step?

There are many ways Social Security could be reformed, and the array of options already on the table speaks to that. The problem, though, is one of political toxicity: any movement toward measures that would increase taxes, reduce or limit benefits, or otherwise alter the program’s mission as an earned benefit quickly becomes polarized. After all, Social Security’s metaphor as the “third rail of politics” is well known.

Within this void of forward motion on the problem, it’s interesting to see momentum building for an approach reminiscent of the 11th-hour steps taken in 1983 in the face of a remarkably similar crisis. Back then, the National Commission on Social Security Reform (a.k.a. the Greenspan Commission) delivered a series of recommendations to address the “current and long-term financial condition of the Social Security trust funds,” identify the problems facing Social Security’s financial position, and provide potential solutions to these problems.

A Tale of Two Bills

Fast forward to 2026, and we see Congress pondering two approaches similar in intent to the Greenspan Commission, both involving procedural changes designed to encourage bipartisan cooperation in creating solutions to Social Security’s complex insolvency problems. The Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act of 2026 (H.R.9187) was introduced in June, and the PROMISE Act of 2026 (S. 4979) was introduced in July, both aiming to remove the political barriers that have stymied corrective action on Social Security’s financial imbalance for decades.

The House bill calls for a 13-member commission, with bipartisan appointees named by both the House and the Senate, a presidential appointee to serve as commission chair, and a co-chair designated by the Speaker of the House. This commission would be charged to develop, for presentation to Congress, a non-amendable proposal to restore Social Security solvency for 75 years.

The PROMISE Act calls for the bipartisan Social Security Advisory Board (SSAB) to compile a 50-year solvency proposal for certification by the Social Security Trustees and subsequently submit it to Congress’s legislative process. Within this legislative process, the SSAB’s proposal would be subject to amendment by the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee.

Does the Commission Approach Ensure Success?

Maybe. Both approaches set strict guidelines for timeliness, with limits for deliberations and debate, set timeframes for deliverables, and assurances that bipartisan viewpoints are factored into their resulting proposals. The intent is to reduce legislative delays and force consideration of a comprehensive solution, rather than the distractions of isolated policy recommendations, and, specifically, to embrace, on a bipartisan basis, the enormity of the problem at hand.

Reflecting on President Ronald Reagan’s message in the 1981 Greenspan Commission announcement, either commission approach could “put aside partisan considerations” in the search for a solution the American people will find fiscally acceptable. The commission approach does not lessen the difficult choices ahead for Congress, but it does structure the process to ensure that the demagoguery so often accompanying purely partisan proposals can be eliminated in favor of forward progress.